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(1)
PRIVATE SECTOR WHISTLEBLOWERS: ARE 
THERE SUFFICIENT LEGAL PROTECTIONS? 
Tuesday, May 15, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on Workforce Protections 
Committee on Education and Labor 
Washington, DC
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m., in Room 2175, 
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lynn Woolsey [chairwoman 
of the subcommittee] Presiding. 
Present: Representatives Woolsey, Payne, Bishop of New York, 
Shea-Porter, Wilson, Price, and Kline. 
Staff Present: Aaron Albright, Press Secretary; Tylease Alli, 
Hearing Clerk; Lynn Dondis, Senior Labor Policy Advisor for Sub-
committee on Workforce Protections; Michael Gaffin, Staff Assist-
ant, Labor; Peter Galvin, Senior Labor Policy Advisor; Jeffrey 
Hancuff, Staff Assistant, Labor; Thomas Kiley, Communications 
Director; Joe Novotny, Chief Clerk; Robert Borden, Minority Gen-
eral Counsel; Steve Forde, Minority Communications Director; Ed 
Gilroy, Minority Director of Workforce Policy; Rob Gregg, Minority 
Legislative Assistant; Richard Hoar, Minority Professional Staff 
Member; Victor Klatt, Minority Staff Director; Jim Paretti, Minor-
ity Workforce Policy Counsel; Molly McLaughlin Salmi, Minority 
Deputy Director of Workforce Policy; Linda Stevens, Minority Chief 
Clerk/Assistant to the General Counsel; and Loren Sweatt, Minor-
ity Professional Staff Member. 
Chairwoman WOOLSEY. A quorum is present. The hearing of the 
Workforce Protection Subcommittee on Private Sector Whistle-
blowers: Are There Sufficient Legal Protections, will now come to 
order. Pursuant to committee rule 12(a), any Member may submit 
an opening statement in writing, which will be made part of the 
permanent record. 
I now recognize myself, followed by Ranking Member Joe Wilson, 
for an opening statement. 
I want to thank all the witnesses for coming today, to testify on 
whether current legal protections are sufficient to protect whistle-
blowers, especially those laws that are administered by the Depart-
ment of Labor. And I want to especially thank both Dr. Wigand 
and Mr. Simon for appearing here today. You are going to tell your 
stories. Being a whistleblower is very difficult, and I know that 
your lives have changed in ways you can never have imagined 
when you first made your decision to come forward. 
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2Today you are among friends. This week is Whistleblowers Week. 
We want to celebrate your actions and praise the substantial public 
service that you have provided, all at a considerable sacrifice to 
yourselves and your families. 
We also want to learn from you because you know far better than 
we do what additional protections are needed so that people like 
yourselves will be encouraged to report illegalities, safety and 
health violations, and fraud and abuse when the situation makes 
it necessary. 
The idea for this hearing was generated by a full committee 
hearing held on the Sago mine disaster on March 28th, 2007, just 
a couple of months ago. At that hearing we heard testimony about 
the blacklisting faced by miners who speak up about safety and 
health risks in the mines. This is true even though they should be 
protected by MSHA, and they find that their very jobs are threat-
ened if they come forward. 
But as our witnesses today will illustrate, miners are not alone 
in having to deal with such problems. Over the years Congress has 
indicated its clear intent to protect whistleblowers by passing over 
30 statutes prohibiting retaliation against employees who report a 
myriad of problems, from environmental spills to health and safety 
violations, to corporate fraud. 
However, while the laws may have made some things better, 
they have not eliminated intimidation, harassment, blacklisting 
and other forms of retaliation. Often the laws themselves are in-
consistent and certainly not always user friendly. 
Let me give you one example. Mr. Fairfax’s office at OSHA ad-
ministers 14 whistleblower provisions. Under these laws complain-
ants have either 30, 60, 90 or 180 days to file their claim, depend-
ing on the statute that they are filing under. These statutes of limi-
tation are very short, sometimes creating insurmountable hurdles, 
especially for someone who has just been demoted or fired from a 
job not for performance, but because he or she may have com-
plained about an unsafe condition at work. 
It is as though in legislating we have created protections or the 
expectation of protection without ensuring that these protections 
are accessible. 
Today we will explore the issues and at least begin to answer 
some important questions: Do we need to expand the laws to cover 
employees currently not covered. Are there procedural and other 
hurdles in the law that we need to change so complainants can suc-
cessfully bring their claims forward? Do we need to look more 
closely at how these laws are being administered, including 
OSHA’s Department of Enforcement? And what is the need for re-
sources in order to process whistleblower claims in a timely man-
ner? 
I am looking forward to all of your testimony, and with that I 
defer to Ranking member Joe Wilson for his opening statement. 
[The statement of Ms. Woolsey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Lynn C. Woolsey, Chairwoman, Subcommittee 
on Workforce Protections 
I want to thank all our witnesses for coming today to testify on whether current 
legal protections are sufficient to protect whistleblowers, especially those laws that 
are administered by the Department of Labor. 
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3And I want to especially thank both Dr. Wigand and Mr. Simon for appearing 
here today to tell their stories. Being a whistleblower is very difficult, and I know 
your lives have changed in ways you could never have imagined when you first 
made your decision to come forward. 
Today, you are among friends. This week is Whistleblowers’ Week. 
We want to celebrate your actions and praise the substantial public service you 
have provided—all at considerable sacrifice to yourselves and your families. 
We also want to learn from you because you know far better than we do what 
additional protections are needed so that people like yourselves will be encouraged 
to report illegalities, safety and health violations; and fraud and abuse when nec-
essary. 
The idea for this hearing was generated by a Full Committee hearing held on the 
Sago Mine Disaster on March 28, 2007. 
At that hearing, we heard testimony about the blacklisting faced by miners who 
speak up about safety or health risks in the mines. This is true even though they 
should be protected by MSHA (the Mine Safety and Health Act) if they came for-
ward. 
But as our witnesses today will illustrate, miners are not alone in having to deal 
with such problems. 
Over the years, Congress has indicated its clear intent to protect whistleblowers 
by passing over 30 statutes prohibiting retaliation against employees who report on 
a myriad of problems, from environmental spills to health and safety violations to 
corporate fraud. 
However, while the laws may have made some things better, they have not elimi-
nated intimidation, harassment, blacklisting and other forms of retaliation. 
And often, the laws themselves are inconsistent and certainly not always user 
friendly. 
Let me give you one example. Mr. Fairfax’s office at OSHA administers 14 whis-
tleblower provisions. Under these laws, complainants have either 30, 60, 90 or 180 
days to file their claim depending on the statute they are filing under. 
These statutes of limitations are very short and sometimes create insurmountable 
hurdles, especially for someone who has just been demoted or fired from a job—-
not for performance—but because he or she may have complained about an unsafe 
condition at work. 
It is as though in legislating, we may have created protections or the expectation 
of protection without ensuring that they are accessible. 
Today, we will explore the issues and at least begin to answer some important 
questions. 
Do we need to expand the laws to cover employees currently not covered? 
Are there procedural and other hurdles in the law that we need to change so com-
plainants can successfully bring their claims forward? 
And do we need to look more closely at how these laws are being administered, 
including OSHA’s Department of Enforcement need for more resources in order to 
process whistleblower claims in a timely manner? 
I am looking forward to everyone’s testimony, 
With that, I defer to Ranking Member Joe Wilson for his opening statement. 
Mr. WILSON. Good afternoon. I would like to thank Chairman 
Woolsey for convening this hearing and welcome our witnesses to 
the subcommittee. At the outset I would also like to thank Chair-
man Woolsey for restoring a sense of fairness to these hearings 
with the witness ratio. 
I believe this hearing to explore the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration’s work will be very informative for our 
panel, and I thank you, the witnesses, for being here today. I look 
forward to your testimony on the whistleblower programs for which 
OSHA is responsible. 
OSHA administers 14 statutes in the whistleblower program. 
The range of issues covered under the programs stem from the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act, OSHA’s core competency, if you 
will, to the newly passed AIR 21 legislation. In addition, several 
environmental laws are covered under this program. 
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4With the addition of the relatively new and far-reaching Sar-
banes-Oxley Act, I am sure that some have questioned the wisdom 
of housing all of these programs at OSHA. That said, I am encour-
aged by the statistics demonstrating OSHA’s performance in inves-
tigating whistleblower-related claims. On average OSHA is dis-
pensing 2,000 whistleblower claims annually, mainly in the OSHA 
and Sarbanes-Oxley arena. At the heart of these programs is the 
issue of whether or not an employer retaliated against a whistle-
blower. 
For example, if an employee correctly brought to light a concern 
about safety, environmental hazards, or financial irregularities and 
then was fired, received a demotion, or had his or her pay cut, this 
is a clear example of retaliation that the law seeks to protect 
against. 
However, it is not always crystal clear. I know this firsthand 
from my National Guard service of 31 years as a staff judge advo-
cate to assist Guard members in reemployment rights and reducing 
discrimination and retaliation against Guard member service. 
In the work of the investigators at OSHA to determine if action 
taken by management is retribution or if the employee simply is 
disgruntled, for example, there are two sides to every story, and 
each side has a right to be heard. The testimony we will hear today 
will highlight how these actions are reviewed and how a deter-
mination is made about the true motivation between the actions of 
employers and employees alike. 
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about this very im-
portant program. 
Chairwoman WOOLSEY. Thank you, Congressman. 
[The statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joe Wilson, Ranking Minority Member, 
Subcommittee on Workforce Protections 
Good afternoon. I’d like to thank Chairwoman Woolsey for convening this hearing 
and welcome our witnesses to the subcommittee. At the outset, I would also like to 
thank Chairwoman Woolsey for restoring some sense of fairness to these hearings 
with the witness ratio. I believe this hearing to explore the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration’s work will be very informative for our panel, and I look for-
ward to your testimony on the whistleblower programs for which OSHA is respon-
sible. 
OSHA administers 14 statutes in the whistleblower program. The range of issues 
covered under the program stem from the Occupational Safety and Health Act—
OSHA’s core competency, if you will—to the newly passed AIR 21 legislation. In ad-
dition, several environmental laws are covered under this program. With the addi-
tion of the relatively new and far-reaching Sarbanes-Oxley Act, I am sure that some 
have questioned the wisdom of housing all these programs at OSHA. 
That said, I am encouraged by the statistics demonstrating OSHA’s performance 
in investigating whistleblower-related claims. On average, OSHA is dispensing 
2,000 whistleblower claims annually, mainly in the OSHA and Sarbanes-Oxley 
arena. 
At the heart of all of these programs is the issue of whether or not an employer 
retaliated against a whistleblower. For example, if an employee correctly brought 
to light a concern about safety, environmental hazards, or financial irregularities 
and then was fired, received a demotion, or had his or her pay cut, this is a clear 
example of retaliation that the law seeks to protect against. However, it is not al-
ways this crystal-clear. I know this first hand from my National Guard Service as 
Staff Judge Advocate to assist Guard members in re-employment rights and reduc-
ing discrimination against Guard member service. 
It is the work of the investigators at OSHA to determine if action taken by man-
agement is retribution or if the employee simply is disgruntled, for example. There 
are two sides to every story and each side has a right to be heard. The testimony 
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5we’ll hear today will highlight how these actions are reviewed and how a determina-
tion is made about the true motivation behind the actions of employers and employ-
ees alike. 
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about this important program. 
Chairwoman WOOLSEY. Without objection, all Members will have 
14 days to submit additional materials or questions for the hearing 
record. 
I would now like to introduce our very distinguished panel of wit-
nesses that are here with us this afternoon. I will introduce you all 
in the order that you are seated and in the order that you will 
speak. 
Jeffrey Wigand has a distinguished background, and his honors 
and activities are too numerous to name. Dr. Wigand may be best 
known for his courageous activities in exposing Big Tobacco. But in 
1998, he founded Smoke-Free Kids, Inc., and has spent the better 
part of a decade speaking out on the dangers of tobacco consump-
tion, especially for children. 
Dr. Wigand received his B.A., master’s and Ph.D. From the State 
University of New York at Buffalo and also received a master’s in 
teaching from the University of Louisville. He also received hon-
orary degrees from Worcester Polytech, the Medical Society of Nova 
Scotia, and Connecticut College. 
John Simon is from Lake Villa, Illinois, and a former trucker. He 
also acted courageously in exposing his former employer’s illegal 
transportation practices. Mr. Simon is a graduate of Gray Lakes 
High School in Illinois. 
Richard Fairfax is the Director of Enforcement Programs at 
OSHA at the Department of Labor. He is a certified industrial hy-
gienist and has been at OSHA for 30 years. Mr. Fairfax received 
his B.A. From California Polytech University and his masters from 
Humboldt State University. 
Lloyd Chinn is a partner at Proskauer Rose in New York prac-
ticing in the areas of labor and employment law. Mr. Chinn re-
ceived his B.S. From Georgetown University and his law degree 
from New York University. 
Richard Moberly is an assistant professor and the Cline Research 
Chair at the University of Nebraska College of Law where he 
teaches employment law and evidence. Professor Moberly is the au-
thor of a study on OSHA’s handling of whistleblowers’ claims under 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. He received his B.A. from Emory Univer-
sity and his law degree from Harvard Law School. 
Tom Devine is the legislative director of the Government Ac-
countability Project, a leading organization representing the rights 
of whistleblowers. Mr. Devine has written extensively about whis-
tleblower laws and has worked with whistleblowers for over two 
decades. Mr. Devine received a B.A. From Georgetown University, 
and his law degree from Antioch School of Law. 
Now, many of you don’t know how we do this, so just before you 
get started, I want to talk to you about the lights and how this all 
works. We have a lighting system. They are in front of you right 
there. We have a 5-minute rule, and everyone, including the Mem-
bers up here, are limited to 5 minutes of presentation and ques-
tioning. 
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6The green light is illuminated when you begin to speak. When 
you see the yellow light, it means you have 1 minute remaining. 
When you see the red light, it means your time has expired and 
you need to conclude your testimony. We will not cut you off in 
midsentence, midthought, but we may cut you off in the middle of 
a long paragraph. 
Please be certain as you testify to turn on the speaker on the 
microphone and speak into it, because it is right in front of you, 
and we will be acting weird up here if you haven’t. So we want to 
hear you. 
Now we will hear from our first witness Dr. Wigand. 
STATEMENT OF JEFFREY WIGAND 
Mr. WIGAND. Good afternoon. First of all, I have to say it is un-
usual for me to read something. I generally speak extempo-
raneously, so in order to maintain the 5-minute time limit, I am 
going to read my testimony. 
Chairman Woolsey and distinguished members of the sub-
committee, thank you for providing me with the opportunity to ap-
pear before you as you seek to strengthen the protections of whis-
tleblowers. I am here today at your invitation to describe a rather 
extreme version of what can happen to a worker in the private sec-
tor who tries to serve public interests and his moral conscience, but 
instead runs afoul of corporate retaliation of the most vicious and 
pervasive kind. 
My name is Jeffrey Wigand, and you may know me as the cen-
tral character of the Hollywood movie The Insider, which docu-
mented for millions of American viewers the unremitting, inhu-
mane, cruel and soul-wrenching daily pressure that can be brought 
to bear against a whistleblower and whose truth-telling comes at 
the highest possible personal price. 
Nineteen years ago I began living the American dream. After a 
quarter of a century as a senior executive at medical and health 
care industry companies, working mostly for Fortune 50 firms, I se-
cured a senior executive position, and I regarded as the apex of my 
ambitions the post of a research executive vice president of one of 
the world’s largest tobacco companies. 
My employer, Brown & Williamson, recruited me with the prom-
ise that they intended to use my scientific expertise in biochemistry 
to engineer a so-called safer cigarette. Naively, I believed the cover 
story and accepted an executive job, which at one point paid over 
$300,000 in salary and afforded a first-class lifestyle in Kentucky 
for me, my wife, and two young children. 
However, I soon came to discover that my trust had been badly 
misplaced, and B&W did not want to have a safer cigarette. In-
stead, I lived in a bizarre upside-down world where lawyers inter-
preted science, and where the first and foremost corporate goal, be-
sides increasing profits, was to hide any scientific or clinical evi-
dence linking tobacco to any of its negative pervasive effects, and 
in a longstanding shadow corporate world nicotine was not addict-
ive, cigarettes were not health-threatening, black was not white, 
and I was living a lie. 
As my long written testimony outlines, when the company’s top 
executives began deliberately editing minutes of scientific meet-
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Chairwoman WOOLSEY. Professor Moberly. 
STATEMENT OF RICHARD MOBERLY, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, 
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA COLLEGE OF LAW 
Mr. MOBERLY. Good afternoon. My name is Richard Moberly. I 
am assistant professor of law in the Cline Williams Research Chair 
at the University of Nebraska. I teach and write about whistle-
blower protection. 
In response to the question this hearing presents, my research 
indicates that whistleblowers have some legal protection, but the 
protection is likely insufficient. Over 30 Federal statutes protect 
whistleblowers and relate to a variety of topics, including work-
place safety, the environment, public health, and corporate fraud. 
However, these statutes provide only a relatively limited amount of 
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protection because of their ad hoc and narrow approaches. Rather 
than protect any employee who reports any illegal activity, Federal 
statutes only protect whistleblowing related to a specific topic or 
statute, and then only if the whistleblower works for an employer 
covered by the statute. 
Even if the right type of illegal activity is reported, the whistle-
blower may or may not be protected, depending on how the em-
ployee blew the whistle. Some statutes only protect employees who 
formally participate in enforcement proceedings, while others pro-
tect employees who affirmatively report illegal activity or who 
refuse to engage in misconduct. Some statutes require reports to be 
made externally to the government, while others protect whistle-
blowers who report misconduct to their supervisors. 
The procedural requirements for a whistleblower to file a claim 
are varied as well. Some laws permit whistleblowers to file claims 
directly in Federal court, while others require whistleblowers to file 
claims with an administrative agency like OSHA. Some of these 
statutes permit only the agency to prosecute claims on an employ-
ee’s behalf, while others permit employees to pursue their own 
claims. 
As Chairwoman Woolsey suggested, the statute of limitation for 
these laws vary from 30 to 300 days, which only compounds the 
confusion created by these multiple protections and procedures. 
Suffice it to say, one would never create this system from scratch. 
Whether a whistleblower is protected depends on the employer 
for which the employee works, the industry in which the employee 
works, the type of misconduct reported, the way in which an em-
ployee blew the whistle, and, under some statutes, the willingness 
of an administrative agency to enforce the law. 
Because of these nuances it is simply too easy for good-faith 
whistleblowers to fall through the gaps created by these varied re-
quirements, a situation that fails to encourage employees to blow 
the whistle and fails to protect them when they do. 
The problems with the current system are illustrated by the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002, which applies to employees of publicly 
traded companies who report fraud. At the time it was passed, 
many expected that Sarbanes-Oxley would provide the broadest 
most comprehensive coverage of any whistleblower provision in the 
world. These expectations have not been realized. Employees rarely 
win Sarbanes-Oxley cases. 
In the act’s first 3 years, only 3.6 percent of Sarbanes-Oxley 
whistleblowers won relief after an OSHA investigation. Only 6.5 
percent of whistleblowers won appeals in front of an administrative 
law judge. Subsequent statistics from OSHA indicate that not a 
single Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower won a claim before OSHA in 
fiscal year 2006 out of 159 decisions made by the Agency during 
that year. 
My empirical study of Sarbanes-Oxley outcomes highlights more 
general problems. First, the legal and procedural nuances I de-
tailed earlier don’t have real bite. Employees who don’t fall square-
ly within the law’s narrow legal boundaries do not get protected. 
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, ALJ determined that 95 per-
cent of whistleblower cases failed to satisfy these boundary issues 
as a matter of law and dismissed those cases. Judges almost never 
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hear the factual merits of whether retaliation occurred because an 
employee blew the whistle. 
Second, ALJs dismissed one-third of Sarbanes-Oxley cases be-
cause whistleblowers failed to satisfy the act’s 90-day statute of 
limitations, demonstrating that such short statute of limitation pe-
riods can have drastic consequences. 
Third, retaliation cases are highly fact-intensive cases that re-
quire resources, time and expertise. Requiring an administrative 
investigation may not efficiently utilize government resources and 
may unduly delay justice under that act. As an example I detailed 
some of the problems with OSHA’s enforcement of Sarbanes-Oxley 
in my written statement. 
As a result of these problems, rank-and-file employees likely can-
not determine the protection available to them before blowing the 
whistle, which means that Federal law is not doing its job of en-
couraging employees to come forward with information about mis-
conduct. 
Society cannot gain the enormous public benefits from whistle-
blowers who disclose health and safety issues and other corporate 
misconduct. To address these issues Congress should comprehen-
sively examine the manner in which Federal law protects whistle-
blowers, and I have detailed specific recommendations in my writ-
ten testimony. Thank you. 
Chairwoman WOOLSEY. Thank you. 
[The statement of Mr. Moberly follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard E. Moberly, Assistant Professor of Law, 
Cline Williams Research Chair, University of Nebraska College of Law 
Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for the invitation 
to appear before you to talk about whether there are sufficient legal protections for 
private-sector whistleblowers. I teach and write about whistleblower protection and 
I am honored to talk with you about this topic. 
The short answer to the question this hearing presents is that there are many 
protections for whistleblowers, but it is doubtful whether there are sufficient protec-
tions. In this testimony, I hope to explain the ways in which current protections fall 
short by focusing on four primary areas: 
1. The importance of encouraging and protecting whistleblowers in the private 
sector; 
2. A general description of private-sector whistleblower protection, particularly 
under federal law; 
3. Examples of whistleblower protection issues under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, to illustrate problems with the federal protection of whistleblowers; and 
4. Areas in which federal whistleblower protection should be more closely exam-
ined. 
1. Whistleblowers Provide a Public Benefit 
A rationale often provided for protecting whistleblowers is one of ‘‘fairness,’’ whis-
tleblowers take a great risk by disclosing information about corporate misconduct, 
and it is unfair that they should be retaliated against because of their actions. 
While this justification has resonance, I want to focus on another rationale: whistle-
blowers provide a substantial public benefit. 
Private sector whistleblowers enhance corporate monitoring and improve cor-
porate law enforcement. We need whistleblowers to report corporate misconduct in 
order to supplement the traditional methods of monitoring corporations. Employees 
know more than others who might discover corporate wrongdoing (such as the gov-
ernment or even an independent board of directors) because they are on-the-ground 
inside the corporation and, collectively, know everything about its inner workings.1 
In fact, even with few corporate or legal incentives provided to whistleblowing em-
ployees, roughly one-third of fraud and other economic crimes against businesses 
are reported by whistleblowers.2
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Furthermore, almost all the benefits of a whistleblower’s disclosure go to people 
other than the whistleblower: society as a whole benefits from increased safety, bet-
ter health, and more efficient law enforcement. However, most of the costs fall on 
the whistleblower. There is an enormous public gain if whistleblowers can be en-
couraged to come forward by reducing the costs they must endure. An obvious, but 
important, part of reducing whistleblowers’ costs involves protecting them from re-
taliation after they disclose misconduct. 
2. Federal Whistleblower Protection for the Private Sector 
Despite the importance of protecting whistleblowers from retaliation, no uniform 
whistleblower law exists. Rather, protections for private sector whistleblowers con-
sist of a combination of federal and state statutory protections, as well as state com-
mon law protections under the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public pol-
icy. These uneven protections are often rightly labeled a ‘‘patchwork,’’ because of the 
wide variance in the scope of protections each provides. 
a. Narrow Substantive Protections for a Broad Range of Industries 
Federal protections for whistleblowers take an ad-hoc, ‘‘rifle-shot’’ approach. Rath-
er than protect any employee who reports any illegal activity, federal statutes only 
protect whistleblowing related to a specific topic or statute, and then only if the 
whistleblower works for an employer covered by the statute. 
For example, the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 only protects 
whistleblowing related to the safety of commercial motor vehicles.3 The only employ-
ees who are protected are drivers of commercial motor vehicles, mechanics, or 
freight handlers who directly affect commercial motor vehicle safety in the course 
of their employment.4
Even if the whistleblower reports the right type of illegal activity, statutes vary 
on whether the whistleblower will be protected depending upon how the employee 
blew the whistle. Some statutes appear to only protect employees who participate 
in proceedings related to violations of particular statutes,5 while others also protect 
employees who affirmatively report illegal conduct 6 or who refuse to engage in ille-
gal activity.7 Moreover, some statutes require reports to be made externally to the 
government,8 while others will protect whistleblowers who report misconduct to 
their supervisors.9
These types of nuanced protections exist for a broad range of industries. More 
than 30 separate federal statutes provide anti-retaliation protection for private-sec-
tor employees who engage in protected activities in a variety of areas, including 
workplace safety, the environment, and public health. Statutes protect employees 
who disclose specific violations in certain safety-sensitive industries, such as the 
mining,10 nuclear energy,11 and airline industries.12 Private sector employees may 
be protected if they disclose corporate fraud on the government 13 or on share-
holders.14 The list of protected employees ranges from the expected—employees who 
make claims under anti-discrimination statutes such as Title VII 15—to the sur-
prising—employees who participate in a proceeding regarding drinking water or 
who report an unsafe international shipping container.16
b. A Wide Variety of Procedural Requirements 
The procedural requirements for whistleblowers to file a claim are as varied as 
the activities protected by the statute. Some statutes permit whistleblowers to file 
claims directly in federal court.17 Others require whistleblowers to file claims with 
administrative agencies, such as the Department of Labor. In fact, 14 statutes re-
quire whistleblowers to file with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
within the Department of Labor. Even among these OSHA statutes, the procedures 
vary depending on the type of claim. Some statutes, like the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, permit only the agency to investigate and prosecute claims of retal-
iation on an employee’s behalf. Others permit employees to pursue their own claims 
by requesting an administrative investigation, from which appeals can be made to 
an administrative law judge, then an administrative review board, and ultimately 
to a federal court of appeals. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has the additional pro-
cedural nuance of requiring whistleblowers to first file a claim with OSHA, but then 
permitting whistleblowers to withdraw their claim and file in federal district court 
if the agency does not complete its review within 180 days. 
Depending on the statute invoked by the whistleblower, the statute of limitations 
for claims can be 30 days,18 60 days,19 90 days,20 or 180 days.21 The statute of limi-
tations for retaliation under employee discrimination statutes can reach 300 days.22
The burdens of proof differ as well. Some retaliation cases require proof that the 
adverse employment action taken against the employee would not have occurred 
‘‘but for’’ the employee’s protected conduct. Others require only that the protected 
activity play a ‘‘motivating,’’ or even less onerously, a ‘‘contributing’’ factor in the 
VerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:23 Nov 14, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 G:\DOCS\110TH\WP\110-37\35185.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
36
adverse employment action. Statutes vary on the level of proof required for employ-
ers to rebut a prima facie case of retaliation, from preponderance of the evidence 
to clear and convincing evidence that the employer would have made the same deci-
sion absent any protected activity. 
c. Many, but not Sufficient, Protections 
Suffice it to say, one would never create this system from scratch. Instead, this 
network of protections has evolved on an ad hoc basis in order to support specific 
statutory schemes. Whether a whistleblower is protected depends upon the employer 
for whom the employee works, the industry in which the employee works, the type 
of misconduct reported, the way in which the employee blew the whistle, and, under 
some statutes, the willingness of administrative agencies to enforce the law. 
Indeed, given this grab bag of statutes, rank-and-file employees likely cannot de-
termine the protection available to them without consulting an attorney before blow-
ing the whistle. Not surprisingly, surveys demonstrate that most employees are un-
aware of the protections they may (or may not) receive should they report wrong-
doing.23 If employees are not aware of or do not understand their protections, then 
these anti-retaliation provisions are not doing their job of encouraging employees to 
come forward with information about misconduct. Society cannot gain the enormous 
public benefits from whistleblowing. Thus, while there may be many legal protec-
tions for whistleblowers, it is doubtful whether there are sufficient protections. 
3. The Sarbanes-Oxley Example 
One statute that might have fixed some of these problems was the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, which Congress passed in response to corporate scandals involv-
ing Enron, WorldCom, and others. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, employees of publicly-
traded companies who report fraudulent activity may bring claims against any per-
son who retaliates against them as a result of their disclosure. By protecting em-
ployees at publicly-traded companies, the hope was to provide protections to a much 
broader range of employees than had previously been protected by statutes focusing 
primarily on particular industries. At the time it was passed, many whistleblower 
advocates and legal commentators expected that Sarbanes-Oxley would provide the 
broadest, most comprehensive coverage of any whistleblower provision in the world. 
a. Whistleblowers Rarely Win 
These expectations have not been realized: employees rarely win Sarbanes-Oxley 
cases. I recently completed an empirical study of all Department of Labor Sarbanes-
Oxley determinations during the first three years of the statute, consisting of over 
700 separate decisions from administrative investigations and hearings.24 Only 3.6% 
of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers won relief through the initial administrative proc-
ess at OSHA that adjudicates such claims, and only 6.5% of whistleblowers won ap-
peals in front of a Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge. That’s 13 whis-
tleblowers at the OSHA level, and 6 at the ALJ level. Moreover, more recent statis-
tics from OSHA indicate that not a single Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower won a 
claim before OSHA in Fiscal Year 2006—out of 159 decisions made by the agency 
during that year. 
This low win rate for whistleblowers has two primary causes. First, administra-
tive decision-makers focus an extraordinary amount of attention on whether the 
whistleblower is the ‘‘right’’ type of whistleblower. Did the whistleblower disclose 
the ‘‘right’’ type of misconduct, to the ‘‘right’’ type of person? Did the whistleblower 
work for the ‘‘right’’ type of company? Did the whistleblower provide a complaint 
precisely within the 90-day statute of limitations? ALJs determined that over 95% 
of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases failed to satisfy one or more of these ques-
tions as a matter of law. Thus, very few whistleblowers were actually provided the 
opportunity to demonstrate that they were the subject of retaliation. 
Second, at the initial OSHA investigative level, when OSHA found that an em-
ployee’s claim actually satisfied all of Sarbanes-Oxley’s legal requirements, OSHA 
still found for the employee only 10% of the time. This low win rate seems sur-
prising, because Sarbanes-Oxley purposefully presents a very low burden of proof 
for employees once their prima facie case is met. 
By themselves, these statistics should give us pause, given the high expectations 
regarding the potential of Sarbanes-Oxley to provide relief to whistleblowers whose 
employers retaliate against them. But, as important, Sarbanes-Oxley’s implementa-
tion illustrates broader problems with the federal ad hoc approach to whistleblower 
protection. 
b. Problems with Whistleblower Protection 
Boundary Problems. First, by only protecting certain types of disclosures and cer-
tain types of employees, federal law puts enormous pressure on whether the whistle-
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blower’s disclosure was the ‘‘right’’ kind of disclosure or the employee is the ‘‘right’’ 
type of employee. Not only is this difficult for employees to predict ahead of time, 
but it also requires line-drawing by decision-makers that can narrow the scope of 
the protections more restrictively than intended by Congress. 
Sarbanes-Oxley demonstrates this problem. The Act protects disclosures related 
to certain federal criminal fraud provisions as well as rules and regulations related 
to securities requirements. Also, the Act only protects employees of publicly-traded 
companies. My study revealed that administrative decision-makers frequently fo-
cused on these two legal requirements to dismiss cases, and often by reading the 
statute’s boundaries very narrowly. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley protects any dis-
closure related to mail or wire fraud, without qualification. However, the DOL’s Ad-
ministrative Review Board has ruled that the disclosure of mail or wire fraud in 
general is not sufficient; the fraud disclosed by a whistleblower must be ‘‘of a type 
that would be adverse to investors’ interests.’’ 25 Similarly, ALJs have ruled that 
Sarbanes-Oxley does not protect employees of privately-held subsidiaries of publicly-
traded companies unless the employee can pierce the corporate veil between the 
companies or demonstrate that the publicly-traded company actively participated in 
the retaliation.26 In this and other instances, such narrow interpretations leave good 
faith whistleblowers without protection if they report the wrong type of fraud or 
work for the wrong type of company. 
Procedural Hurdles. Procedural hurdles loom large for whistleblowers. For exam-
ple, ALJs dismissed one-third of Sarbanes-Oxley cases because the whistleblower 
failed to satisfy Sarbanes-Oxley’s relatively short 90-day statute of limitations. As 
I noted earlier, the limitations period of other federal whistleblower protection stat-
utes ranges from 30 to 300 days. Short filing periods can have drastic consequences. 
Because most employees who file whistleblower claims allege that they lost their 
jobs,27 additional time to file claims would provide whistleblowers the ability to first 
take care of pressing responsibilities, such as finding another job and dealing with 
the upheaval of losing a primary source of income, before ultimately locating a com-
petent attorney to file a claim. 
Investigating Claims. Third, retaliation cases are highly fact-intensive cases that 
require resources, time, and expertise. Requiring an administrative investigation 
prior to an adjudicatory hearing may not efficiently utilize government resources. 
For example, when Sarbanes-Oxley was added to OSHA’s responsibilities, OSHA did 
not receive any additional funding for cases that now consist of approximately 13% 
of OSHA’s caseload. This lack of resources has led to lengthy delays to resolve cases: 
although the Act’s regulations mandate that OSHA complete its investigation within 
60 days, the average length of a Sarbanes-Oxley investigation in Fiscal Year 2005 
was 127 days. Also, OSHA had primarily dealt with environmental and health and 
safety statutes prior to Sarbanes-Oxley. Asking the agency to discern the nuances 
of securities fraud seems well beyond its traditional scope. Moreover, OSHA inves-
tigators who must examine cases involving 14 different laws may not adequately dif-
ferentiate among provisions that often provide for different burdens of proof and 
substantive protections. Add to that internal OSHA procedures that did not give the 
whistleblower a full and fair opportunity to rebut an employer’s allegations, and it 
should not be surprising that few Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers have been success-
ful at the OSHA investigative stage of their claim. In short, the Sarbanes-Oxley re-
sults call into question OSHA’s utility as an investigative body for whistleblower 
claims. 
4. Areas to Examine 
There are two main types of questions to consider going forward. First, if you are 
satisfied with the current ‘‘rifle-shot’’ approach to whistleblower protection, are 
there ways in which it can be improved? Second, if the current model is not satisfac-
tory, what would a different model look like? 
a. Improving the Current System 
Clarifying Broad Protections. In areas such as Sarbanes-Oxley, in which it can be 
demonstrated that administrative decision-makers or courts have narrowly read the 
protections that Congress already has granted, Congress could clarify the statute’s 
broad reach. Passing legislation that clearly repudiates decisions narrowing an act’s 
scope could alleviate the tendency of decision-makers to draw restrictive legal 
boundaries in whistleblower cases. Congress has repeatedly taken such an approach 
for federal employee whistleblowers when administrative and judicial rulings under-
mined the broad protections of the Civil Service Reform Act and, more recently, the 
Whistleblower Protection Act.28 Congress should similarly examine federal statutory 
protections for private sector whistleblowers. 
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Lengthening the Statute of Limitations. The short statutes of limitations that cur-
rently exist are unrelated to the goals of whistleblower statutes and serve no real 
purpose other than to trip up unsuspecting whistleblowers after they have already 
taken the serious risk of coming forward with information about misconduct. In-
creasing statutes of limitations to at least 180 days would be an easy, but nonethe-
less extremely helpful, solution. 
Improving Transparency. The adjudication of whistleblower claims should be more 
transparent. For example, OSHA does not publish any of its statistics or decision-
letters. I received them by asking OSHA directly and by submitting a Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) request. No information about monetary awards or settle-
ments are publicly available and OSHA denied my FOIA request for this informa-
tion. The Office of Administrative Law Judges puts its decisions on the internet, but 
does not compile any statistics about its results. Statutory requirements that em-
ployers post notices about the available whistleblower protections are inconsistent: 
some statutes have them, others do not. The lack of meaningful, public information 
about whistleblower provisions and cases interpreting them fails to provide employ-
ees sufficient guidance regarding whether they will be protected if they blow the 
whistle, and also undermines the public discourse about whether these protections 
are effective. The decisions, and the decision-making process, of administrative 
agencies need more public oversight. 
b. Implementing New Protections 
The Importance of Defining Legal Boundaries. The problems with the current sys-
tem can inform decisions on the areas on which one should focus when imple-
menting new protections. Given the problems with the current narrow boundaries 
of many whistleblower provisions, a new whistleblower law should protect whistle-
blowers for disclosing a broad range of illegal activities. But, as with everything, the 
devil is in the details. Should whistleblowers who report any illegal activity be pro-
tected? Or only activity that is illegal under federal law or some subset of federal 
laws? Should we require whistleblowers to be correct that the activity they report 
is, in fact, illegal, or should we protect whistleblowers who reasonably disclose mis-
conduct in good faith, even if the misconduct is not actually illegal? Should we re-
quire whistleblowers to report illegal activity externally to a law enforcement officer, 
or should we protect whistleblowers who report misconduct internally to their super-
visor? 
I am quite confident you understand that legal definitions and boundaries mat-
ter—it is what you debate everyday. My point is that for whistleblower protections 
in particular, the evidence demonstrates that the boundaries you draw will have 
real bite, for two reasons. The first relates to the nature of whistleblowing: whistle-
blowers take real risks, and the current topic-by-topic, ad hoc approach to protecting 
whistleblowers does not provide employees sufficient certainty regarding their pro-
tections as they decide whether to blow the whistle. Second, statutory boundaries 
particularly matter for whistleblower protections because of the manner in which 
whistleblower laws currently are administered: narrow protections only encourage, 
or in some instances, require administrative and judicial decision-makers to define 
whistleblowers out of protected categories. Agencies and courts currently spend too 
much time debating whether this is the ‘‘right’’ type of employee, the ‘‘right’’ type 
of report, or the ‘‘right’’ type of illegal activity, and not enough effort determining 
whether retaliation occurred. Broadly defining the legal boundaries of any new pro-
tection may enable decision-makers to focus on the important factual question of 
causation: was this employee retaliated against for reporting something illegal? 
Providing Structural Disclosure Channels. Finally, I urge you to examine other 
types of encouragement for whistleblowers. For example, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, Congress required publicly-traded companies to implement a whistleblower 
disclosure channel directly to the company’s board of directors. This internal report-
ing mechanism can supplement anti-retaliation protections because it encourages re-
porting directly to individuals with the authority and responsibility to respond to 
information about wrongdoing. Procedural and structural modifications that encour-
age effective employee whistleblowing should be considered along with any reform 
of anti-retaliation protections.29
5. Conclusion 
From one perspective, whistleblowers demonstrate that employees can be effective 
as corporate monitors. At great risk to their careers, a few employee whistleblowers 
bravely attempt to expose wrongdoing at corporations involved in misconduct, such 
as Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and others. 
Viewed differently, however, such isolated scandals also illustrate the difficulty of 
relying upon employees to function as effective corporate monitors. The financial 
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misconduct at Enron and other companies lasted for years before being revealed 
publicly. Countless lower-level employees necessarily knew about, were exposed to, 
or were involved in the wrongdoing and its concealment—but few disclosed it, either 
to company officials or to the public. Thus, while whistleblowers who reveal cor-
porate misconduct demonstrate employees’ potential to monitor corporations, the 
fact that so few have come forward also confirm that this potential often is not fully 
realized. 
The challenge for policy-makers is to provide sufficient encouragement and protec-
tion for employees so that they can fulfill their essential role of corporate moni-
toring. Without employees willing to blow the whistle on corporate misconduct, we 
lose one key aspect of society’s ability to monitor corporations effectively. Thorough 
and comprehensive statutory whistleblower protections will encourage private-sector 
whistleblowers and should be an integral part of our corporate law enforcement ef-
fort. 
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